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This paper analyzes the optimal choice of pricing schedules and technological deterrence levels in a marketwith digital piracy where sellers can influence the degree of piracy by implementing digital rights manage-
ment (DRM) systems. It is shown that a monopolist’s optimal pricing schedule can be characterized as a simple
combination of the zero-piracy pricing schedule and a piracy-indifferent pricing schedule that makes all cus-
tomers indifferent between legal usage and piracy. An increase in the quality of pirated goods, while lowering
prices and profits, increases total surplus by expanding both the fraction of legal users and the volume of legal
usage. In the absence of price discrimination, a seller’s optimal level of technology-based protection against
piracy is shown to be at the technologically maximal level, which maximizes the difference between the quality
of the legal and pirated goods. However, when a seller can price discriminate, its optimal choice is always a
strictly lower level of technology-based protection. These results are based on the following digital rights con-
jecture: that granting digital rights increases the incidence of digital piracy, and that managing digital rights
therefore involves restricting the rights of usage that contribute to customer value. Moreover, if a digital rights
management system weakens over time due to the underlying technology being progressively hacked, a seller’s
optimal strategic response may involve either increasing or decreasing its level of technology-based protection.
This direction of change is related to whether the DRM technology implementing each marginal reduction in
piracy is increasingly less or more vulnerable to hacking. Pricing and technology choice guidelines are presented,
and some welfare implications are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Over the last decade, sellers of digital products have
actively fought the availability of pirated copies of
their products. Nevertheless, digital piracy rates are
still high and increasing in many markets, despite
a continuous increase in the availability and sophis-
tication of copy protection and digital rights man-
agement technologies. Studies of piracy trends by
the Business Software Alliance indicate that while
the worldwide software piracy rate declined between
1994 and 1999, it increased again in 2000 and 2001 and
continues to rise in the Asia-Pacific and Eastern Euro-
pean regions (Business Software Alliance 2003). In
addition, as recently as 2003, about 36% of all installed
desktop software worldwide was pirated (Business
Software Alliance 2004). Piracy concerns have fur-
ther expanded following the emergence of file-sharing
networks like Gnutella and Kazaa, which have sub-
stantially increased the availability and exchange of
high-quality illegal versions of software, music, and
digital video. While entertainment industry estimates
of lost sales from piracy, pegged at up to $10 billion
annually (Murphy 2003), may be overstated, there
is evidence that access to file-sharing networks may
reduce the probability of legal purchases by up to 30%
(Zentner 2003), and that piracy reduces both legiti-
mate revenues and the pricing power of sellers of
music (Hui and Png 2003).
The sustained presence of piracy complicates the
design of pricing schedules for sellers of digital goods.
It also poses the new challenge of choosing an appro-
priate level of technology-based protection, and of
strategically responding to the hacking of existing
digital rights management (DRM) systems. These are
the issues addressed by the model in this paper.
The first part of the paper studies pricing strategy
in the presence of piracy. When faced with rising
digital piracy, a seller’s pricing power is increasingly
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limited by the quality and availability of pirated
copies that are imperfect substitutes for the legally
available product. This effect of piracy is analyzed by
developing a model of monopoly price discrimination
in which heterogeneous customers can buy variable
quantities of a digital good, and different customer
types get differing value from the usage of the legal
good as well as from the usage of its pirated sub-
stitute. A number of examples of digital goods used
in varying quantities are discussed in §2. The seller’s
optimal pricing schedule is shown to be a simple com-
bination of two contracts—the optimal pricing sched-
ule in the absence of piracy (termed the zero-piracy
pricing schedule) and a piracy-indifferent pricing sched-
ule that makes all customers indifferent between legal
usage and piracy. While the presence of an inferior
pirated substitute lowers prices and profits, it may
lead to social benefits realized through an expansion
in both the fraction of customers who purchase the
product legally as well as the volume of legal usage.
The next part of this paper studies technology-based
protection against digital piracy, typically achieved
by implementing DRM systems. DRM platforms
for digitally delivered products include SecureMedia
Encryptonite (which is embedded in many digital tele-
visions), Macrovision SafeCast, Apple’s FairPlay, and
Microsoft Windows Media DRM Series. Other DRM
systems aimed specifically at protecting the physi-
cal sources of the digital files shared illegally over
the Internet include the Windows Media Data Session
Toolkit, and Macrovision’s Cactus Data Shield.
However, implementing effective DRM-based tech-
nological deterrence often necessitates a direct reduc-
tion in the value of the legal product. For instance, all
DRM platforms for digital video and music involve
encryption that increases file sizes, thereby lower-
ing value by increasing download times for digitally
delivered content. Textual content that is protected by
Adobe’s DRM partners can be electronically scanned
by OCR software that takes PDF files as direct inputs
and produces near-perfect scanned versions. Deter-
ring this form of piracy will necessitate degrading
fonts in rendered legal files, again lowering quality
for legal users.
More importantly, implementing DRM often con-
strains the flexibility of usage for a legal user. Many
online music services implement DRM by limiting
the rendering of MP3 files to a single device, and
by placing related restrictions on the portability of
these files. Highly restricted services like MusicNet
and Rhapsody were not especially successful when
first introduced, and this is partly attributed to the
fact that their protection schemes “   treat everyone
like a potential criminal, and they take all the joy
out of buying and playing music” (Mossberg 2003).
In contrast, the iTunes music service from Apple has
chosen to place substantially fewer restrictions on a
customer’s ability to download, share, and burn pur-
chased MP3 files,1 at the risk of facing higher levels of
piracy. This service has enjoyed early success, captur-
ing an estimated market share of 70% for legal digital
music as of mid-2004 (Flynn 2004, Levy 2004). Analo-
gously, restricting printing rights for ebooks prevents
the creation of high-quality pirated PDF versions,
but discourages ebook adoption by customers used
to reading printed pages. The inability to create a
backup of a digital movie on a DVD disc reduces ille-
gal secondary sales but deters value to legal digital
purchasers.
Managing digital rights therefore involves restrict-
ing the rights of usage that contribute to customer
value, and reducing this value in the process. Con-
sequently, when choosing the appropriate level of
technology-based protection against piracy, the seller
of a digital good needs to trade off the effective-
ness of deterring piracy with the value reduction of the
legal product that is caused by the implementation of
the DRM system. To study this trade-off, the second
part of the paper incorporates endogenous choices of
technology-based protection into the model of pric-
ing with digital piracy developed in the first part. The
technologically maximal level of protection, which is
the level of protection at which the quality difference
between the legal good and the pirated good is max-
imized, is contrasted with the profit-maximizing level
of protection. When a seller can price discriminate,
its profit-maximizing level of protection is shown
to be strictly lower than the technologically maximal
level. The economic drivers of this result are explored
1 iTunes allows users to burn their MP3 files to an unlimited num-
ber of CDs, copy them to an unlimited number of iPod MP3 play-
ers, play them on up to three computers, and stream them over a
private LAN.
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in some detail because they indicate that even after
accounting for quality degradation on legal prod-
ucts, a DRM system that maximizes the quality gap
between the legal good and the pirated good is over-
protecting the digital product. Additionally, as the
effectiveness of a DRM system weakens over time,
which typically occurs due to its technology being
progressively hacked, a seller’s optimal technologi-
cal and pricing responses are examined. It is shown
that the seller may wish to either decrease or increase
its level of technology-based protection. Conditions
under which each of these responses is optimal are
characterized, and the implications for preemptive
under- or overprotection are discussed.
The model in this paper views pricing strategy and
technological deterrence as alternative instruments a
seller can use to manage piracy, which is consistent
with the model in Png and Chen (2003) and also
with the observation that a software publisher can
reduce piracy through increased deterrent controls or
by reducing market price (Gopal and Sanders 1998).
When allowed to price discriminate, this paper shows
that a monopolist chooses a lower (and superior, both
profit-wise and socially) level of DRM protection,
suggesting that pricing policy and DRM technology
can be complementary instruments for piracy deter-
rence, rather than necessarily being substitutes (Png
and Chen 2003). The monopolist’s investment in
technology-based deterrence is indeed excessive from
a welfare-maximizing perspective because any level
of DRM protection is socially suboptimal, though
it is shown that admitting price discrimination can
mitigate the level of overprotection to some extent,
as can the threat of DRM hacking in some cases.
This paper also expands Png and Chen’s observa-
tion that subsidies on legal usage are desirable. The
threat of piracy causes a price-discriminating mono-
polist’s choice of pricing to subsidize legal purchases,
and also results in differential subsidies to different
customer types. Apart from increasing total surplus,
this has the potentially desirable welfare property of
reducing the differences in consumer surplus between
different customer types.
Unlike Png and Chen (2003), explicit taxes on copy-
ing devices or government subsidies on legal usage
are not considered. Moreover, technology-based con-
trols modeled in this paper directly influence the
quality of the pirated good; the formation of shar-
ing groups or software clubs (Gopal and Sanders
1998, Bakos et al. 1999) is not explicitly modeled.
This focus allows a far richer demand and tech-
nology specification—usage in variable quantities by
customers who value both legal usage and piracy dif-
ferentially, simultaneously admitting a combination of
second-degree price discrimination and variable tech-
nological protection against piracy, and explicitly con-
sidering the negative effect that DRM can have on
the value from legal usage. A distinguishing aspect of
this paper is therefore its deeper analysis of the eco-
nomic effects of DRM technologies, and their role as
technological deterrents to piracy that are controlled
explicitly (and strategically) by a seller who can also
use pricing policy to manage piracy.
This paper also contributes to the literature on
the economics of copying and piracy (Johnson 1985,
Liebowitz 1985). Conner and Rummelt’s (1991) early
model of strategic piracy deterrence establishes that
increases in protection technology always increase
firm profits, unless the product displays positive net-
work effects. More recently, Belleflamme (2003) stud-
ies the interdependence between different producers’
incentives to accommodate/deter the presence of a
pirated good. Chellappa and Shivendu (2003) model
sampling and pricing in the presence of a pirated
good derived from an evaluation version of the legal
good. The model in this paper builds on the approach
of each these papers, by preserving their notion of the
pirated good as an inferior (vertically differentiated)
substitute for the legal good, a model on which many
prior IS papers are based (for instance, Nault 1997).
Additionally, it generalizes their pricing analysis sig-
nificantly, by modeling and deriving a menu of prices,
rather than a single variable price or a pair of prices
for two quality-differentiated products. It also explic-
itly takes into account the differing value of pirated
products to different customer types. This generaliza-
tion is important because it substantially alters results
relating to the optimal level of technological protec-
tion and to post-implementation protection and pric-
ing trends. These are differences that would not be
evident in a model with unit consumption and no
price discrimination. This approach is also more likely
to provide managerially relevant pricing guidelines
because the results prescribe a straightforward way
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to actually design pricing schedules in the presence
of digital piracy, as illustrated by a simple example
in §5.
Unlike the piracy models in Conner and Rummelt
(1991), Takeyama (1994), and Shy and Thisse (1999),
positive network externalities are not considered.
These externalities are significant in many software
markets (as documented for spreadsheet software,
for instance, by Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996);
in the industries more recently threatened by digi-
tal piracy—music, video, and content—there may be
indirect network effects (from complementary device
sales) and word-of-mouth effects. Their presence is
likely to directionally strengthen the results of this
paper, as discussed briefly in §6.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides an overview of the model and
describes the seller’s optimal pricing schedule in the
absence of piracy. Section 3 derives the optimal pric-
ing strategy in the presence of different levels of
digital piracy. Section 4 models the economic effects
of using digital rights management, derives optimal
technology-based protection levels, and characterizes
strategic responses to changes in the effectiveness of
an implemented DRM system. Section 5 presents a
brief example. Section 6 discusses the managerial and
welfare implications of the model’s results, and con-
cludes with directions for future research.
2. Model
2.1. Seller and Customers
I model a digital good that may be used by consumers
in continuously varying quantities. This could either
be a homogeneous information good, e.g., a software
package that corporations install on a varying num-
ber of employee desktops (the unit of variable quan-
tity in this example would be the number of licenses),
or an electronic teaching case, like those bought in
varying quantities from the Harvard Business School
Press by universities, often with substantial volume
discounts (the unit of variable quantity for this exam-
ple would be number of students who are licensed
to access the electronic case). Other possible examples
that are similar might include corporate purchases of
ebooks for employees, purchases of code comprising
digital versions of copyrighted entertainment charac-
ters (paid for based on the number of instances the
code is used), and so on. Alternatively, the model also
applies to large libraries of related digital goods2 from
which different customers use different subsets. For
instance, a digital music service that offers access to a
large bundle of songs (such as the million-plus-song
library available to users of Apple’s iTunes) of which
each user desires and pays for a small fraction—the
unit of variable quantity would be the number of
songs downloaded in this case. Another example of
this kind is a news service that offers access to a large
archive of articles (like the New York Times archive)
from which different readers download different arti-
cles, paying per archived article downloaded (which
would be the unit of variable quantity in this case).
Other related examples include libraries of graph-
ics/clipart, music videos, journal articles, ringtones,
games, or film archives. As more goods become dig-
ital, the set of examples of this kind is likely to
increase.
The seller of the digital good (termed the legal good)
is assumed to be a monopolist, by virtue of owning
a copyright. Any fixed costs of production or IP pro-
tection are assumed to be sunk, and variable costs
of production are zero. In addition to the legal good,
there is also a pirated good available, which is a lower-
quality substitute for the legal good and is free.
Customers are heterogeneous, indexed by their
type  ∈ . The preferences of a customer of type
 for a good of quality z are represented by the mul-
tiplicatively separable utility function
u
q z= zU
q (2.1)
where q is the quantity of the good used by the cus-
tomer. The function U
q is assumed to take the
following form:
U
q= q− 12q2 (2.2)
This functional form is chosen for analytical conve-
nience. The paper’s results generalize directionally for
more abstract functional forms, as discussed in §3.
2 This might also be viewed as a multiproduct pricing problem,
with each of the goods being treated as a separate product. How-
ever, for extremely large sets of digital goods (like the millions of
songs or news articles mentioned in the examples), precise mul-
tiproduct nonlinear pricing is unlikely to be practically viable.
A more detailed discussion of this point is available from the
author.
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Subscripts of functions represent partial deriva-
tives with respect to the corresponding variable. For
instance, the partial derivative of U
q with respect
to q is denoted Uq
q, and the cross-partial of
U
q with respect to q and  is denoted Uq
q .
This notation is preserved throughout the paper.
The following properties of the utility function fol-
low from Equation (2.2).
(1) For every , U
q has a finite maximum usage

= argmaxq U 
q= .
(2) Uq
q > 0 for q < 
, and Uq
q < 0 for
q > 
.
(3) Uqq
q  = −1, and Uq
q  = 1. Therefore,
U
q is strictly concave in q (diminishing marginal
value from usage), and has the Spence-Mirrlees single
crossing property.
The quality of the legal good is denoted by the vari-
able v, and the quality of the pirated good is denoted
by the variable s. The preferences of a customer
of type  for the legal good and the pirated good
are therefore represented by the functions vU
q
and sU
q, respectively, where q is the quantity
of the good (legal, pirated) used by the customer
and U
q is as defined in (2.2). The parameter s
is related to how much customers value the pirated
good, and it is also interpreted as the threat of piracy
faced by the seller.
The levels of quality v and s are initially exoge-
nous (in §3) and then influenced by the seller’s choice
of DRM protection (in §4). However, s is always
assumed to be strictly less than v, implying that the
pirated good is always strictly inferior to the legal
good, and therefore the seller can make a nonzero
profit. While pirated software is generally considered
inferior due to reasons directly related to product
value (restrictions on functionality, lack of technical
support), the feasibility of digital replication of con-
tent might suggest that pirated goods and legal goods
may be perceived as being of equal quality by poten-
tial buyers; however, this is generally not the case.
When attempting to access pirated content on peer-
to-peer file-sharing networks like Gnutella and Kazaa,
users often cannot find the exact title they are look-
ing for. Even when available, locating this title can
be slow and unreliable (due to the way pure peer-
to-peer networks operate). Download speeds can be
extremely slow. Often, the contents of media files are
not what they were supposed to be, partly due to
the posting of decoy files by media companies.3 Fur-
thermore, the resolution of pirated songs and movies
is variable (and often poor). Using pirated products
opens the user to the threat of litigation. Each of these
factors can lead a user to view the legal good as being
of higher quality, and the lower value of s relative to
v is a simple way of modeling this.
The maximum value that a customer of type  can
get from a pirated good of quality s is denoted uˆ
 s:
uˆ
 s= sU

 = s
2
2
 (2.3)
Because the pirated goods are free, uˆ
 s is the reser-
vation utility of customer type .
The monopolist does not observe the type  of any
customer, but knows F 
 (the probability distribu-
tion of types in the customer population). For expo-
sitional simplicity, and because the hazard rate of the
customer-type distribution plays a significant role in
subsequent analysis, we define the inverse hazard rate
function h
:
h
= 1− F 

f 

 (2.4)
and the cumulative inverse hazard rate function H
:
H
=
∫ 

1− F 
x
f 
x
dx (2.5)
The probability distribution of types is assumed to
have the following properties.
(1) f 
 > 0 for all , where f 
 is the density cor-
responding to the distribution F 
.
(2) h
 ≤ 0 for all : the inverse hazard rate is
nonincreasing in .
Each customer knows his or her own type . With-
out any loss in generality, the total number of cus-
tomers in the market is normalized to one.
2.2. Customer Choice and Pricing Schedules
The seller offers a nonlinear pricing schedule (some-
times referred to as either a contract or a pricing sched-
ule) that assigns a nonnegative price to each feasible
3 Ripley (2004) reports that this is an active deterrence strategy
by movie companies, and that bogus postings by “bored hackers”
contribute further to this issue; for instance, downloads of pirated
copies of what was purportedly The Last Samurai “turned out to be
Scary Movie 3, Santa Clause 2 and a porn flick” (p. 56).
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level of usage for the legal good. Rather than con-
sidering all possible pricing functions, the revelation
principle ensures that we can restrict our attention
to direct mechanisms—menus of quantity-price pairs
q
t 
t, indexed by t ∈ —that are incentive
compatible. The function 
t specifies the total price
for a usage level q
t; the variable t has the same
domain as the variable , and is used for notational
clarity in Equations (2.6) and (2.7) below. A pricing
schedule q
t 
t, t ∈  for the legal good is said
to be incentive compatible if it satisfies
= argmax
t
vU
q
t − 
t for all  (2.6)
Given a pricing schedule q
t 
t for the legal good,
a customer of type  purchases the legal good if the
surplus from doing so is at least as much as the value
the customer would derive from the (free) pirated
good. Mathematically, if
max
t
vU
q
t − 
t≥ uˆ
 s (2.7)
then customers of type  purchase the legal good.
Therefore, an incentive-compatible pricing schedule
q
 
 is said to induce participation from customer
type  if all customers of this type (weakly) prefer the
legal good to the pirated good:
vU
q
 − 
≥ uˆ
 s (2.8)
The constraint (2.8) above is often referred to as the
piracy constraint for type  because it becomes pro-
gressively harder to satisfy as s increases. Note that
the piracy constraint is type dependent. In the special
case of s = 0, the pirated good has no value, uˆ
 s=
0, and constraint (2.8) above reduces to the standard
individual rationality constraint.
Finally, the optimal pricing schedule q∗
v s
∗
v s is the incentive compatible pricing schedule
that maximizes the seller’s profits.
In general, the sequence of events is as follows: The
seller announces its pricing schedule (and technolog-
ical choices, if any), the customers make their pur-
chase decisions (whether to use the legal good or the
pirated good, and at what usage level) based on the
pricing schedule, and each party gets its payoffs. An
exact timeline is specified separately in each of the
following sections.
2.3. Optimal Pricing Schedule in the Absence
of Piracy
The optimal pricing schedule in the absence of piracy,
termed the zero-piracy pricing schedule, is specified in
this section. The zero-piracy pricing schedule bench-
marks the analysis of pricing in the presence of piracy,
and is also used in constructing the corresponding
optimal pricing schedules.
Lemma 1. The zero-piracy pricing schedule qZP
v
ZP
v, which is the optimal pricing schedule for the
seller when s = 0, takes one of the following two forms.
(a) If h
≤ , then the pricing schedule is designed to
include all customer types. The optimal contract is
qZP
v= −h
 (2.9)
ZP
v= v
2−h
2
2
+ vH
 (2.10)
for all  ∈ .
(b) If h
 > , then a set ZP of customer types
are priced out of the market, where ZP is defined as
ZP =  h
=   ∈ 
 (2.11)
The optimal contract is
qZP
v= −h
 (2.12)
ZP
v = vh
ZP
2−h
2
2
+ vH
−H
ZP (2.13)
for  ∈ ZP, and
qZP
v= 0 ZP
v= 0 (2.14)
for  ∈ ZP.
All proofs are available in the appendix.
3. Pricing with Digital Piracy
This section analyzes pricing strategy when the seller
faces digital piracy. The sequence of events modeled
in this section is summarized in Figure 3.1.
3.1. Piracy-Indifferent Pricing Schedule
This section specifies the incentive-compatible pricing
schedule that implements piracy indifference. Under
this pricing schedule, all customer types are indiffer-
ent between the legal good and the pirated good. This
pricing schedule is important because it often forms
a building block for the optimal pricing schedule.
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Figure 3.1 Timeline of Events for Section 3
The quality of the goods 
v and s become known 
to customers and seller.
The seller announces a 
pricing scheme q(θ), τ(θ).
Customer types in set Θ
purchase the legal good, 
others use the pirated good 
Customers and seller 
receive their surplus/profits.
t
{ ( ( ) ) ( ) ( )}ˆ: vU q , u ,sΘ = θ θ θ − τ θ ≥ θ .
Lemma 2. The unique incentive compatible, piracy-
indifferent pricing schedule qPI
v s PI
v s for the
legal good takes the following form:
qPI
v s= s
v
 (3.1)
PI
v s= sv− s
2
2v
 (3.2)
Under this pricing schedule, each customer type gets the
same surplus from its optimal usage of the legal good of
quality v and its maximal usage of the pirated good of
quality s.
Lemma 2 establishes that there is a unique piracy-
indifferent pricing schedule, under which each cus-
tomer type gets a net surplus exactly equal to its
reservation utility—the value uˆ
 s that the customer
would get from his or her maximal usage of the
pirated good. From Equation (3.1), all customer types
purchase positive quantities of the legal good under
this pricing schedule. The usage levels of the legal
good are strictly increasing in the quality of the pirated
good s. In addition, (3.2) indicates that so long as s < v,
the total payment PI
v s from each customer type
 is strictly positive, and the piracy-indifferent pricing
schedule is therefore profitable for the seller.
3.2. Optimal Price Discrimination in the Presence
of Piracy
This section describes how to design the seller’s opti-
mal pricing schedule in the presence of piracy. Its
main result is presented below.
Theorem 1.
(a) When the quality of the pirated good is lower—that
is, when s ≤ v−h
/ —the seller’s optimal pricing
schedule is a modified version of the zero-piracy pricing
schedule, with total prices adjusted downwards by the same
amount across all usage levels. The optimal contract is
q∗
v s= qZP
v (3.3)
∗
v s= ZP
v− s
2
2
 (3.4)
for all  ∈ , where qZP
v and ZP
v are as
defined in Equations (2.9) and (2.10).
(b) When the quality of the pirated good is higher—that
is, when s > v−h
/—the seller’s optimal pricing
strategy is as follows.
(i) Customer types are partitioned into two sets,
 ˆ and ˆ, where the transition type ˆ is defined by
ˆ=  vh
= v− s  ∈ 
 (3.5)
(ii) The optimal pricing schedule for the lower set
of customers is simply the piracy-indifferent pricing
schedule:
q∗
v s= qPI
v s (3.6)
∗
v s= PI
v s (3.7)
for  ∈  ˆ.
(iii) The optimal pricing schedule for the higher set of
customers is an adjusted version of the zero-piracy pricing
schedule, with total prices adjusted downward by the same
amount across all usage levels:
q∗
v s= qZP
v (3.8)
∗
v s = ZP
v
−
(
vH
ˆ− v− sˆ
2
2
+ v
2
2
)
 (3.9)
for  ∈ ˆ, where ZP
v is as defined in Part (a) of
Lemma 1, in Equation (2.10).
Theorem 1(a) establishes that when the quality
of the pirated good is lower,4 the optimal pricing
4 Clearly, the condition s ≤ v−h
/ of Theorem 1(a) does not
just depend on the quality of the pirated good s, but also depends
on v, , and h
. The statement “when the quality of the pirated
good is lower” is meant to indicate that for a fixed distribution,
and fixed values of v and , the proposition is more likely to apply
at lower values of s.
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schedule is simply the zero-piracy pricing schedule,
with a constant reduction in total price across all
usage levels. The resulting usage level of each con-
sumer is unaffected by the presence of piracy, and the
reduction in total price across all customers is propor-
tional to s. An immediate corollary is that as the qual-
ity of the pirated good s increases, prices are strictly
lower at all usage levels.
Theorem 1(b) establishes that at higher quality lev-
els for the pirated good, the portion of the optimal
pricing schedule that is relevant to a lower set of
customer types  ˆ is simply the piracy-indifferent
pricing schedule. Because qPI
v s > 0, all these cus-
tomer types purchase positive quantities of the legal
good. It can be shown that ˆ > ZP, and therefore any
customer type who did not purchase in the absence
of piracy is now a legal user at the piracy-indifferent
usage level qPI
v s.
The presence of digital piracy can therefore have
the socially beneficial effect of inducing legal usage
from customers who may have otherwise been
excluded by the seller’s optimal price discrimination.
While counterintuitive, this result has a straightfor-
ward economic explanation. In the absence of piracy,
when the seller is a monopolist and there is no imper-
fect substitute for the seller’s legal good, the seller
finds it favorable to price discriminate in a manner
that captures a higher level of surplus from the cus-
tomer types  > ZP, at the cost of excluding customer
types ZP from the market. The only reason why
customer types  ∈ ZP are excluded is because the
seller’s optimal surplus extraction from higher cus-
tomer types would not be feasible if there was any
positive usage level affordable to these lower cus-
tomer types. In the presence of piracy, each customer
type who purchases the legal good must be provided
with positive surplus of at least uˆ
 s—the value
from maximal usage of the pirated good. Because the
seller is forced to provide this surplus level to the
higher set, customer types in the lower set can now
be offered positive and affordable usage levels, with-
out affecting incentive compatibility (and the seller’s
price-discrimination objectives).
It is straightforward to establish that because
qZP
 s < qPI
 s for  ∈  ˆ, total usage either
remains constant or goes up for all customer types,
relative to the usage levels under the zero-piracy
contract, and this increase is more pronounced at
higher values of s. As a consequence, the total value
vU
q∗
v s  created by the usage of each cus-
tomer type also increases, which in turn implies that
total surplus is higher at higher levels of s. These
observations are illustrated further in Figure 3.2.
Additionally, under the optimal pricing schedule, all
customer types get a surplus level that is at least as
high as their reservation utility uˆ
 s; the latter is
also the surplus to each customer under the piracy-
indifferent pricing schedule. This increase in con-
sumer surplus is due to the seller’s desire to increase
profits beyond the level obtained under the piracy-
indifferent contract, by inducing higher usage across
all customer types. Higher usage is necessarily accom-
panied by an increase in surplus for all types to
ensure incentive compatibility.
Together, PI
 and qPI
 may imply a pricing
function for which successive marginal prices are
increasing for certain ranges of q. However, so long
as average price is decreasing in q, the pricing sched-
ule implied by the piracy-indifferent contract can still
be implemented. In the event that this is not the case,
the schedule can be approximately implemented by
using a family of two-part tariffs, as discussed in §6.4
of Wilson (1993) and §9.5 of Laffont and Martimort
(2002).
Theorem 1 is proved for a specific utility func-
tion, in which value (from both legal and pirated
usage) is multiplicatively separable into a quadratic
function U
q and the quality parameter v (or s).
However, the main result—that optimal pricing in the
presence of piracy is a combination of the piracy-
indifferent pricing schedule and an adjusted version
of the zero-piracy pricing schedule with total prices
adjusted downward by the same amount across all
usage levels—generalizes quite broadly.5 Loosely, the
restrictions necessary for the result to hold are that
utility u
q z is strictly concave in usage, has a
specific though not unusual kind of curvature (that
uq
q  z is strictly positive, nondecreasing in q, and
nonincreasing in ), and that the variation in specific
marginal rates of change in utility with quality are
positive at both z= v and z= s.
5 The mathematical details of the exact conditions under which the
result generalizes are available on request.
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Figure 3.2 Changes in Pricing and Surplus as the Quality of the Pirated Good s Changes
( ( ) )PI HvU q ,v,s ,θ θ
( ( ) )PI LvU q ,v,s ,θ θ ( )PI H,v,sτ θ
( )* L,v,sτ θ
( )* H,v,sτ θ
( ( ) )ZPvU q ,v ,θ θ
α βLθˆ HθˆZPθ
Customers priced out
of the market under the
zero-piracy pricing scheme
Additional customers who adopt
the piracy-indifferent pricing
scheme as sL increases to sH
increasing s
( )PI L,v,sτ θ
Notes. For s= sL sH , the piracy-indifferent pricing schedules are qPI  v  s	 
 PI  v  s	, and the total surplus generated by the usage of customer type  is
vUqPI  v  s	 	. The difference between vUqPI  v  s	 	 and 
 PI  v  s	 is the minimum surplus that type  must be provided to induce them to purchase
the legal good, rather than using the pirated good. The thicker curves represent the optimal total prices and total surplus from optimal usage, while the dotted
curves correspond to the portions of the “building blocks” that are not part of the optimum. As shown, the optimal pricing schedule always involves the
piracy-indifferent contract, for a subset of lower types  ˆ. The set of types  ZP  who would have been priced out of the market under the zero-piracy
pricing schedule are now included. As s increases, the increase in UqPI  v  s	 	− 
 PI  v  s	 forces the seller to expand the lower set of customers, and to
lower prices for the higher types as well. Moreover, as s increases, the surplus vUq∗ v  s	 	 generated by each customer type’s consumption increases,
which raises total surplus.
4. Digital Rights Management
This section studies DRM systems that enable a seller
to explicitly control its level of piracy protection. In
addition to choosing a pricing schedule, the seller is
now assumed to choose a level of technology-based
protection  ∈ 01. This choice affects the quality
level of both the legal good and the pirated good, as
discussed in §1. Specifically, at a level of technology-
based protection , the quality of the legal good is
denoted v
 and the quality of the pirated good is
denoted s
. The functions v
 and s
 are assumed
to have the following properties.
(1) v
 > s
 for all : The quality of the legal
good is strictly higher than the quality of the pirated
good, for all  ∈ 01.
(2) v
 < 0, s
 < 0: The quality of both the
pirated good and the legal good are strictly decreas-
ing in the level of technology-based protection .
(3) s
0 < v
0: An increase in the level of tech-
nology-based protection initially reduces the quality
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Figure 4.1 Timeline of Events for Section 4
The quality functions v(ρ)
and s(ρ) become known 
to customers and seller.
The seller announces the 
level of DRM protection ρ,
and the pricing scheme 
q(θ), τ(θ).
Customer types in set Θ purchase
the legal good; the other customer 
types use the pirated good
{ ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ( ))}.ˆ: v U q , – u ,sΘ = θ ρ θ θ τ θ ≥ θ ρ
Customers and 
seller receive their 
surplus/profits.
t
of the pirated good more rapidly than the quality of
the legal good. In other words, the DRM system is
effective, at least initially.
(4) v
 < s
. The rate of quality degrada-
tion of the legal product increases relative to the
rate of quality degradation of the pirated good as 
increases. This property implies diminishing returns
from increasing technology-based protection  and
also ensures that v
= s
 at a unique point.
The costs to the seller of changing the level of pro-
tection  are assumed to be zero. This assumption is
made to highlight the strategic and revenue effects
of changes in technology-based protection levels. The
sequence of events is summarized in Figure 4.1.
4.1. Technologically Maximal Protection Level
Given a pair of quality functions v
 and s
, the
technologically maximal level of technology-based pro-
tection e is defined as the level of technology-based
protection that maximizes the difference in quality
between the legal good and the pirated good:
e = argmax

v
− s
 (4.1)
Under the properties of v
 and s
, the function
v
 − s
 is strictly concave in , and therefore e
is unique. The technologically maximal level e is of
interest because it seems like an intuitively natural
choice for the seller, particularly when no variable
costs are incurred from altering the level of protection.
It is also likely to be the level of protection marketed
by a DRM vendor who is interested in highlight-
ing the technological effectiveness of its solution (for
instance, by advertising lots of reduction in piracy,
only a minimal effect on product quality).
Additionally, if the seller does not price discrimi-
nate and chooses to charge each customer the same
usage-independent fee T , then e is the optimal
level of DRM protection. To see why this is the
case: Given values of T and , the customer type 
who is indifferent between the legal good and the
pirated good solves:
v

2
2
− T = s

2
2
 (4.2)
which implies that the indifferent type  at a price T
and protection level  is
=min
[

√
2T
v
− s

]
 (4.3)
In the former case (when all customers adopt),
T = v
− s

2
2
 (4.4)
and the seller maximizes profits by maximizing
v
− s
. In the latter case, the profit function that
the seller maximizes when simultaneously choosing
the optimal values of  and T is
!
T = T
[
1− F
(√
2T
v
− s

)]
 (4.5)
The first-order condition !
T = 0 for the optimal
 yields(
T
√
2T

v
∗− s
∗3 × f
(√
2T
v
∗− s
∗
))
· v
∗− s
∗= 0 (4.6)
which implies that
v

∗− s
∗= 0
because T > 0, f 
x > 0 for all x, and v
 > s
.
This choice of technologically maximal DRM pro-
tection when the seller charges all customers the same
price has a simple intuitive explanation. Without the
ability to price discriminate, the seller’s profits are
driven entirely by the piracy constraint for the cus-
tomer type  who, at price T , is indifferent between
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the legal good and the pirated good. The difference in
value between the legal and pirated good for this cus-
tomer type  is v
− s
U

 , which is also
equal to the fixed fee that the seller charges all cus-
tomers. Any increase in v
− s
 is therefore strictly
profit improving for the seller.
4.2. Optimal Technology-Based Protection when
the Seller Price Discriminates
This subsection characterizes the seller’s optimal level
of technology-based protection when the seller can
price discriminate, and shows that it is always strictly
lower than the technologically maximal level defined
earlier.
Suppose that the relevant pricing schedule across
the entire range  ∈ 0e is as specified by Theorem
1(a). This occurs when h
 ≤ v
− s
/v
 for
all  ∈ 0e. Under the optimal pricing schedule, the
seller’s profits as a function of  are
!
 = !L
≡
∫ 

(
2v
− s

2
+ v

[
H
− h

2
2
])
f 
d
(4.7)
In contrast, under Theorem 1(b), the piracy constraint
is binding for a positive fraction  ˆ of customers;
moreover, the seller’s increased pricing power from
an increase in v
 only applies to the higher set ˆ
of customer types. For a specific , define ˆ
 as the
transition type between the two portions of the opti-
mal pricing schedule derived in Theorem 1(b):
ˆ
= v
h
=v
−s
 ∈ 
 (4.8)
This is identical to the definition of ˆ in (3.5), sim-
ply indexed by . Correspondingly, under the opti-
mal pricing schedule specified by Theorem 1(b), the
seller’s profits as a function of  reduce to
!
 = !H
≡
(
s
v
− s

v

)∫ ˆ


2
2
f 
d
+ v

∫ 
ˆ

(
H
− h

2
2
)
f 
d
+ 1− F 
ˆ

(
v
− s
ˆ
2
2
− v
H
ˆ

)
 (4.9)
The next result shows that under either set of these
conditions, the optimal level of technology-based pro-
tection ∗ is always strictly lower than the technolog-
ically maximal level e.
Theorem 2. The profit-maximizing level of technology-
based protection ∗:
∗ = argmax

!
 (4.10)
is always strictly lower than the technologically maximal
level of protection e. That is, ∗ < e, where e is defined
in (4.1).
Theorem 2 is a surprising result because it indicates
that at the optimal ∗ a small increase in technology-
based protection would actually degrade the quality
of the pirated good more than the quality of the legal
good. However, it is not profitable for the seller to
implement this increase in protection. The result is
illustrated graphically in Figure 4.2
This result can be explained intuitively by exam-
ining its underlying economic effects. When the dig-
ital good is less easily replicable (that is, under the
conditions of Theorem 1(a)), the piracy constraints
defined in (2.8) are nonbinding for all customer types
 > . Therefore, the cost to the seller of a marginal
increase in s
 is proportionate to the value the low-
est type  =  gets from the pirated good. Simulta-
neously, the benefits of a marginal increase in v

are twofold. First, there is an increase in total price
across all users due to the weakening of the piracy
constraint for  = , which is identical in magnitude
to the cost of the marginal increase in s
 described
above. In addition, there is a revenue change equal
to the sum of the different changes in total price for
different customer types that arises from optimally
readjusting prices to satisfy incentive compatibil-
ity. Under the optimal pricing schedule, the lat-
ter effect of a marginal increase in v
 is always
positive.
Put simply, a small increase in s
 strengthens the
piracy constraint, while a small increase in v
 weak-
ens the piracy constraint (in an identical and oppo-
site way). Additionally, this small increase in v

also improves the seller’s ability to price discriminate
across all the customer types. Therefore, when the
seller can price discriminate, the benefit of a marginal
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Figure 4.2 Result of the Optimal Level of Technology-Based
Protection ∗
ρ
ρ
vρ ρ( )
sρ ρ( )
( )s ρ
( )v ρ
2
2
2
2
*v h
H ) f d
β
ρ
α
− ρ θ
= θ − θ θ
α ³
( ) ( )( ( ) ( )
ρ∗ ρe
marginal benefit from price 
discrimination at the optimal 
protection level ρ∗
Notes. ∗ is strictly lower than e, the technologically maximal level. e
occurs at the point where the difference between v	 and s	 is maximum,
which is when v	 − s	 = 0 . However, as illustrated, the first-order
conditions for maximizing the seller’s profits L	 indicate that the optimal
level ∗ is at a point where v	− s	 is strictly positive because there
is an additional marginal benefit from increased pricing power when v	 is
higher.
increase in v
 is more than the cost of a corre-
sponding marginal increase in s
. As a consequence,
∗ <e.
Correspondingly, under the conditions of Theorem
1(b), a marginal increase in s
 strengthens the piracy
constraint across all the customer types in the lower
set  ˆ
, whose usage levels are according to
the piracy-indifferent contract. However, a marginal
increase in v
 balances this effect exactly for each
customer type. The result establishes that in addition,
the marginal increase in v
 still has a net positive
effect on the seller’s pricing power for the higher set
ˆ
.
Clearly, Theorem 2 would continue to hold even
if there was a direct fixed or variable cost to imple-
menting DRM, so long as this cost was nondecreasing
in the level of technology-based protection. Further
implications of the result are discussed in §6.
4.3. Strategic Responses to Weakening
DRM Technology
Often, a DRM technology weakens over time, largely
due to it being hacked by engineers who are trying
to “break” the protection scheme. This section investi-
gates how a seller should alter its level of technology-
based protection and pricing in response to this
progressive weakening of the DRM technology. The
discussion in this subsection uses the profit function
corresponding to the conditions under which the pric-
ing schedule does not include a piracy-indifferent seg-
ment, as derived in Theorem 1(a) and specified by
!L
 in (4.7). Comparable results hold for the case
corresponding to Theorem 1(b), or for the profit func-
tion !H
 specified in (4.9), though the correspond-
ing analysis is more involved.
The weakening of the DRM system is modeled as
causing a gradual increase in the quality of the pirated
good over time. Specifically, if the level of technology-
based protection chosen is , the initial quality of
the pirated good—immediately after implementing
DRM—is denoted s
0, and its quality at time t is
represented by the function s
 t, where st
 t > 0.
This is because as DRM protection weakens, the dig-
ital product becomes easier to pirate. Additionally,
increasing the protection level  reduces the quality
of the pirated good, as in §4.2.
It is assumed that the quality of the legal good v

is not directly affected by the weakening of the DRM
system. The seller’s profit function therefore takes the
following form:
!L
t =
∫ 

(
2v
−s
t
2
+v

[
H
− h

2
2
])
f 
d (4.11)
and the optimal level of protection at time t, denoted
∗
t, solves
∗
t= argmax

!L
 t (4.12)
There are many ways in which s
 t might evolve
over time. An important clarification here is that there
are no intertemporal demand dependencies in the for-
mulation. The discussion implicitly assumes a new
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Figure 4.3 Changes in the Optimal Level of Technology-Based Protection if a DRM System Is Progressively Weakened Over Time
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set of customers at each point in time t and exam-
ines changes in protection that are optimal given the
changes in the relationship between s and  that is
determined by s
 t.
Three scenarios are analyzed. The optimal tech-
nological and pricing responses prescribed for the
seller are directionally different in each case, and these
scenarios were chosen to highlight these differences.
Under the first scenario, there is a constant upward
drift in the quality of the pirated good, across all lev-
els of protection:
st
 t > 0 st
 t= 0 (4.13)
In this case, the marginal properties of s
 t with
respect to  do not change over time. That is, s
 t=
s
0 for all t. Because s
 t is constant over time,
the optimal level of technology-based protection ∗
t
is constant and unaffected by the weakening of the
technology. The seller should consequently maintain
the same level of technology-based protection. While
v
∗
t remains unchanged, s
∗
t t increases over
time because st
 t > 0. Therefore, total prices should
be lower over time, at each usage level.
Under the second scenario, the weakening of the
DRM system leads to smaller changes in the quality of
the pirated good at higher levels of technology-based
protection:
st
 t > 0 st
 t < 0 (4.14)
This type of change is illustrated in Figure 4.3(a). It is
characteristic of a DRM system under which higher
levels of protection not only reduce the quality of the
pirated good (by making it harder to replicate the dig-
ital good), but also make it increasingly difficult to
hack the system.
Because st
 t < 0, the weakening of the DRM
technology reduces the slope of s
 t over time (that
is, makes the slope more negative), thereby moving
the function s
 t downward. As a consequence, the
optimal level of protection shifts to the right, and the
seller’s optimal technological response is to increase
its level of technology-based protection over time.
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The optimal adjustment  from ∗
0 to ∗
t causes
a net decrease in the quality of the legal good to
v
∗
t, accompanied by what is typically a net
increase in the quality s
∗
t t of the pirated good
relative to the initial value s
∗
00. The pricing
schedule in Theorem 1 indicates that this should lead
to a decrease in total prices. Even if there is a net
decrease in the quality of the pirated good s
 t,
it will be lower in magnitude than the correspond-
ing decrease in the quality of the legal good v
. As
discussed in §4.2, this always lowers prices. There-
fore, in conjunction with its technological response,
the seller’s optimal pricing response to the weaken-
ing of the DRM system is to reduce prices across all
customer types.
The third scenario is where the weakening of the
DRM technology leads to larger changes in the quality
of the pirated good at higher levels of protection:
st
 t > 0 st
 t > 0 (4.15)
This type of change is illustrated in Figure 4.3(b). It is
characteristic of a technology for which higher levels
of protection reduce the quality level of the pirated
good, but the technology that implements every
marginal increase in the level of protection is increas-
ingly vulnerable to hacking. Note that the assumption
that s
 t < 0 is maintained, and so quality levels of
the pirated good continue to be lower at higher levels
of protection, even post-hacking.
In contrast with the earlier scenario, because
st
 t > 0, the weakening of the DRM technology
increases the slope of s
 t over time, thereby mov-
ing the function s
 t upwards. As a consequence,
the optimal level of protection moves to the left, and
the seller’s optimal technological response is to reduce
its level of technology-based protection over time.
As the optimal level of protection ∗
t decreases,
there is a substantial increase in the quality of the
pirated good s
∗
t t. There is also an increase in
the quality of the legal good (because ∗
t decreases,
v
∗
t increases). It is clear that the increase in
s
∗
t t is more than the increase in v
∗
t—
however, as discussed in §4.2, a marginal increase in
the quality of the legal good increases prices and prof-
its more than a corresponding marginal increase in
the quality of the pirated good. Therefore, the direc-
tion of the pricing response cannot be characterized
in general. However, because the prices for lower cus-
tomer types are progressively more affected by the
quality of the pirated good, the pricing response will
be progressively less favorable for higher customer
types, independent of its direction.
Sometimes, implementing frequent changes to its
level of technology-based protection  is costly for
the seller. If the seller anticipates that there will be a
weakening of the DRM system over time, it may be in
its best interest to start out by overprotecting its legal
good under the second scenario and underprotecting
it under the third scenario. This issue is discussed fur-
ther in §6.
5. Example
In this section, the optimal pricing schedule is derived
explicitly for a specific family of customer-type dis-
tributions. This example, based on Theorem 1, fur-
ther illustrates the effects of digital piracy on pricing,
usage, and welfare, and highlights the effect of vary-
ing some properties of the customer-type distribution.
The family of customer-type distributions used in
the example have a shifted beta density function6
B
a b, with support 1 + , a = 1, and
parametrized by b ≥ 1. When b = 1, the distribution
is the unit uniform distribution U1 + . When
b > 1, the distribution is positively skewed and f 

is strictly decreasing in . The beta density function is
illustrated in Figure 5.1, for a candidate set of b values.
When a= 1 and b > 0, the beta distribution has the
distribution function F 
= 1− 
1+− b and den-
sity function f 
 = b
1+ − b−1. Accordingly, the
inverse hazard rate function h
 and the cumulative
inverse hazard rate function H
 take the following
form:
h
= 1− 
−
b
 (5.1)
H
= 2
−− 
−
2
2b
 (5.2)
For the purpose of this example, the value of v is
normalized to one. The optimal pricing schedules are
6 The general form of the beta density function is
B
xa b= x
a−1
1− xb−1

a b

where 
a b= ∫ 10 xa−1
1−xb−1 dx is the beta function with param-
eters a and b.
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Figure 5.1 Beta Density Function Used to Characterize Different
Customer-Type Distributions in the Example, with a = 1,
and for Different Values of b
f (θ)
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θ
derived based on the results of §3.2. Because v has
been normalized to one, it is dropped as an argument
of the pricing and usage functions.
Table 5.1 summarizes the relevant consumption
and total pricing functions that define the optimal
pricing schedule. When the quality of the pirated
Table 5.1 Optimal Contracts and Surplus Expressions for the Example
Intermediate contracts
Zero-piracy usage level: qZP 	= 1+ b− + 1
b
.
Piracy-indifferent pricing schedule: qPI  s	= s;

 PI  s	= s1− s
2
2
.
Transition type ˆ: ˆ= + 1− b1− s
1+ b1− s .
Optimal pricing schedule
Lower quality of pirated good
For s≤ 1− 1
b
q∗ s	= 1+ b− + 1
b
;

 ∗ s	= 1− sb
22 − 1+ 1+ b2− 	− − 	2
2b2
.
Higher quality of pirated good
For s≥ 1− 1
b
, and  ≤ ˆ q∗ s	= s;

 ∗ s	= s1− s	
2
2
.
For s≥ 1− 1
b
, and  ≥ ˆ q∗ s	= 1+ b	− + 1	
b
;

 ∗ s	= ˆ1− s
2
+ 1+ b2− 	+ − 	
2
2b2
− 2ˆ− 	+ ˆ− 	
2
2b
.
good is lower, an explicit pricing function can be
easily derived:
p
q =
(
2+b
2b2
b+1−

2+
2
1+b −
2s
2
)
+ 2
1+q−q
2
2
b+1  (5.3)
The optimal pricing schedule is therefore a nonlinear
two-part tariff. This is the kind of tariff that would
be optimal in the absence of piracy, and (5.3) implies
that at low levels of piracy, it continues to remain so,
though with a reduction in the fixed part of the two-
part tariff that is proportionate to the quality of the
pirated good. The properties of the variable portion
are better understood by differentiating both sides of
(5.3) with respect to q:
pq
q=

1+− q

b+ 1  (5.4)
pqq
q=−
1

b+ 1  (5.5)
Equation (5.5) implies that the variable portion of
the optimal pricing schedule is strictly concave in
q for any b > 0. In addition, (5.4) indicates that the
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Figure 5.2 Usage Levels and Total Price for Different Customer Types in the Example
moderate
piracy level
high piracy
level
b, αα
α
( )*q , sθ
α,b
α
b
α
( )* , sτ θ
θˆθˆ
(a) Optimal usage q*(θ, s) for each type θ (b) Total price τ*(θ, s) for each type θ
b
θˆθˆ
moderate
piracy level
high piracy
level
α α+1
θ
α α+1
θ
Notes. The dashed curves depict a moderate piracy level, while the solid curves depict a higher level of piracy. The labeled arrows represent the direction in
which the respective curves or points shift when the corresponding parameter increases (and while only one set of curves is labeled, the shift is directionally
identical for both s values). For instance, an increase in w raises the usage levels and total price for all types, at all feasible levels of piracy.
marginal price pq
q is strictly increasing in  and
strictly decreasing in b. This indicates that variable
prices increase with an average increase in value and
are lower when there is a higher proportion of the
lower customer types, but are unaffected by s, as one
would expect from Theorem 1(a).
When the quality of the pirated good is higher,
Figure 5.2 illustrates the usage function q∗
 s and
total price function ∗
 s for moderate and high
piracy levels. The labeled arrows in the figures rep-
resent the direction in which the functions shift in
response to a change in the corresponding param-
eter. As the quality of the pirated good s increases,
the lower set of customer types expands, and there is
a strict increase in each of these customers’ (piracy-
indifferent) usage levels. The legal usage of the rest
of the customers remains the same; however, the total
price paid by each of these customer types is strictly
lower. Moreover, the variable portion of the tariff is
now lowered by an increase in the quality of the
pirated good.
An increase in  increases both the usage and total
price across all customers, and also shifts a frac-
tion of customers away from the piracy-indifferent
contract. An increase in the skewness of the dis-
tribution of customer types (an increase in b, as
depicted in Figure 5.2) increases the size of the higher
customer-type set. This increase in skewness does not
affect consumption or pricing for those customers
who remain in the lower set—however, for all other
customers, there is a strict increase in consumption
and a strict reduction in price. This is because as b
increases, there is a larger density of customers at
the lower end of the market, and it is in the seller’s
interest to increase usage for lower customer types,
thereby increasing the surplus generated by the usage
of these customers, as well as the seller’s profit
potential. This increase is at the expense of lower pric-
ing power on the higher end of the market, which
makes sense intuitively because there are fewer high-
type customers.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
A number of new results relating to managing digital
goods subject to piracy have been derived in §§3 and
4. This section discusses some of these results further,
highlighting pricing and technology-based protection
guidelines, discussing some welfare issues, and con-
cluding with an outline of open research questions.
6.1. Guidelines for Pricing with Digital Piracy
With a positive but relatively low threat of piracy,
Theorem 1(a) shows that piracy affects a seller’s pric-
ing power uniformly across its different customer
segments. This is despite the fact that each of these
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segments may value the pirated good differently.
Consequently, the seller’s pricing strategy should be
to design the optimal pricing schedule unconstrained
by piracy, and then simply adjust total prices down-
ward across all usage levels, by an amount propor-
tionate to the value its lowest customer type would
get from the pirated good.
As piracy levels increase, sellers need to segment
their customers more carefully, paying closer atten-
tion to the differential value that customers may get
from the pirated good. The optimal pricing adjust-
ment in response to a higher threat of piracy often
induces legal purchasing by a new set of customers
who were previously priced out of the market. The
corresponding part of the pricing schedule is based on
the piracy-indifferent contract, which is a low-price,
low-usage pricing schedule. Additionally, as piracy
levels increase, pricing for the higher segment of the
market should be lowered further, by the value the
lowest customer type in this segment would derive
from the pirated good.
As the market for a successful digital product
matures, there is often an increase in desired usage
levels across all customers in the market (which corre-
sponds to a shift in the type distribution to the right,
modeled as an increase in the value of ). In response,
the seller should expand the fraction of customers
included in its higher segment, and simultaneously
increase prices. Alternatively, the seller may observe
a net increase in average desired usage because of
a progressive upward shift of lower-end customer
types, which results in a flattening of the distribution
of customer types. In this case, it is optimal for the
seller to shrink the higher segment, move more cus-
tomer types into the piracy-indifferent segment, and
raise prices for the higher segment.
6.2. Guidelines for Managing DRM-Based
Piracy Deterrence
DRM is a valuable technological deterrent to piracy,
and can improve a seller’s profitability substantially.
The model in §4 highlights the importance of consid-
ering the effects that a seller’s DRM implementation
will have on the value of its legal product, and pro-
vides guidelines for how to optimally balance value
reduction with piracy deterrence. An immediate con-
sequence of this trade-off is that excessive restrictions
on legal usage that aim to deter piracy can result in
a failure to create a viable market for the legal good.
As discussed in §1, the early success of Apple’s iTunes
music service that, at the risk of higher piracy lev-
els, placed far fewer restrictions on legal usage than
its online predecessors like MusicNet and Rhapsody
may be an instructive illustration.
A more subtle result is that if the seller can price
discriminate, choosing the level of protection that bal-
ances marginal value reduction with marginal piracy
deterrence—the technologically maximal level—is
never optimal. Instead, the seller is always better off
choosing a lower level of technology-based protec-
tion. When considering potential DRM solutions, it is
natural for sellers to focus primarily on the ability of
the technology to deter piracy. However, because the
effect that DRM has on the value of the legal good
is more important for profitability, sellers may need to
realign their focus when evaluating these products.
Correspondingly, when designing rights management
technologies, a vendor should focus more on how
effective its solution will be in preserving the value
provided to legal users because this is the dominant
profit driver for its corporate customers.
Even the best DRM technologies are unlikely to be
hacker-proof. The results of §4.3 provide technological
and pricing responses for sellers who must deal with
this reality, and establish that it is critical that sellers
understand the DRM technology before they respond
to the threat of hacking. As shown in §4.3, the nature
of the interaction between the level of protection and
the corresponding difficulty of breaking the protection
scheme is what determines the optimal technological
response. In implementing each marginal increase in
protection, if the DRM system relies on technology
that is increasingly fragile, then the seller is likely to
need to reduce its protection levels over time. On the
other hand, if the successive “pieces” of the system
are progressively more robust, the seller’s best strate-
gic response to hacking is to increase its level of
technology protection over time, and simultaneously
reduce its prices.
While pricing responses are easy to implement,
continuous variation of technology-based protection
levels over time is often expensive, technologically dif-
ficult, and sometimes impossible to implement. As a
consequence, it may be good strategy to preemptively
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implement a suboptimal level of protection, based on
the appropriate expectation of how future hacking
will affect piracy levels. Again, a clear understanding
of the details of the technology is crucial—whether
an increase in protection levels makes the technol-
ogy more robust or more vulnerable to hacking is
an important determinant of whether to preemptively
overprotect or underprotect.
6.3. Welfare and Policy Issues
The analysis in §3 suggests that the presence of digital
piracy may lead a seller to alter pricing in a manner
that increases the legal usage of existing customers,
and that includes lower-end customers who had been
priced out of the market earlier. These changes raise
total surplus, and the increase is a consequence of
higher legal usage—welfare benefits from piracy that
have not been highlighted in the literature thus far,
which has focused on surplus that might be gener-
ated from the use of the pirated product. Moreover,
there may be a corresponding increase in distribu-
tional equity because total surplus is shared more
evenly between customer types. These increases in
surplus come at the expense of a reduction in seller
profits, which may affect incentives for the creation
of content. This trade-off needs to be analyzed before
concluding that piracy has unilateral welfare bene-
fits. However, in many creative industries (such as
music, art, and literature), the ability to capture rents
from one’s creations may not be the primary driver of
innovation.
Digital piracy has also led to a stronger emphasis
on protecting intellectual property using technology,
rather than the legal system. This has already led to
substantial debate about the extent to which copy-
right owners should be able to control the usage of
their products, especially in light of the somewhat
overreaching legal protection that the 1998 Digital
Millennium Copyright Act provides these owners.
The social benefits of digital piracy that are outlined
above strengthen recent arguments (Samuelson 2003)
that one needs to carefully assess the welfare implica-
tions of an enforcement system that increasingly relies
on technology, thereby giving sellers a broader set of
rights over their content in practice.
6.4. Concluding Remarks
A logical direction for future research would be to
extend the model of this paper to a dynamic set-
ting, allowing one to study the optimal technology-
protection paths of §4.3 more precisely. An extension
of this kind may also admit the possibility of mod-
eling how customers use pirated goods as a way of
assessing the quality of a experiential digital good,
as explored in a simpler setting by Chellappa and
Shivendu (2003).
A natural question that arises in light of the past lit-
erature (Conner and Rummelt 1991, Takeyama 1994)
relates to how the relationship between network
effects and piracy might change when one admits
price discrimination in addition to endogenous
choices of protection technology. Directionally, the
presence of a positive network effect would strengthen
the results of §4.2 because the network benefits from
increased gross usage would suggest the optimal-
ity of even lower levels of technology-based pro-
tection. Solving a model that incorporates network
effects explicitly would indicate the magnitude of this
impact, and is another interesting direction of future
investigation.
Another potentially important externality is the
usage externality induced by piracy. Because most
pirated goods are “produced” from legal copies of
the product, their quality and availability may be pro-
portionate to the extent of legal usage of the prod-
uct. For example, pirated software is generally made
available by legal users who crack the software’s copy
protection scheme, and therefore the quality (and
availability) of pirated software is likely to be higher
when there are more legal users. Correspondingly,
the variety of pirated music available on file-sharing
networks depends on the variety of music legally
purchased by the users who create illegal copies.
As the proportion of purchases via digital channels
increases, this becomes a particularly important effect,
and one which a seller should consider when pric-
ing its product or choosing a level of DRM technol-
ogy. This is a negative externality from the point of
view of the seller, but a positive externality for its
customers. Studying how this externality affects pric-
ing and welfare represents another promising line of
work.
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In conclusion, this paper describes how to design
effective pricing policy in the presence of digital
piracy, how to simultaneously use price discrimina-
tion and technology-based protection to deter piracy,
and how to appropriately vary protection levels in
response to a weakening of one’s DRM technology.
I hope these results will deepen our understanding
of the economics of digital piracy, help guide man-
agerial decisions in the growing number of industries
whose products are being digitized, and motivate fur-
ther research into this increasingly important area.
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. In the absence of piracy, all cus-
tomer types have equal reservation utility of zero. The util-
ity function vU
q and the inverse hazard rate h
 of the
customer-type distribution satisfy all the conditions neces-
sary to apply the solution to the standard nonlinear pricing
model, where all types with nonzero allocations are sep-
arated at the optimum. See Maskin and Riley (1984) for
an exposition of the theory or Lemma 1 of Sundararajan
(2004), which provides a complete proof of a more gen-
eral version of this model (in the absence of piracy). Under
this solution, the optimal allocation to each type  ∈ 
satisfies
qZP
v=max'q
v0( (A.1)
where, for each , q
v is the unique solution to
vUq
q
v = vUq
q
v h
 (A.2)
and the optimal total price charged to type  ∈  is
ZP
v = vU

qZP
v
−
(
vU
qZP
v+
∫
x∈Q
vU
q
ZP
xvxdx
)

(A.3)
where
Q= ' q
v≥ 0( (A.4)
Recall that U
q = q − 12q2. Substituting the functional
forms for Uq
q and Uq
q  into (A.2) yields
q
v= −h
 (A.5)
(a) Because h
≤ 0, if h
≤ , it follows that q
v≥ 0
for all . As a consequence, for each ,
qZP
v= −h
 (A.6)
Substituting (A.6) into (A.3) and rearranging yields
ZP
v=v
(
2−h
2
2
− 
2−h
2
2
−
∫ 

x−h
xdx
)

which simplifies to the expression in (2.10).
(b) If h
 > , then q
v < 0. However, we know that
h
= 0, and therefore that q
v= >. Because h
≤
0, this implies that there is a unique ZP ∈ 
 such that
ZP = h
ZP (A.7)
q
v < 0 for  < ZP (A.8)
q
v > 0 for  > ZP (A.9)
Consequently, from (A.1), it follows that
qZP
v= 0 for  ≤ ZP (A.10)
qZP
v= −h
 for  ≥ ZP (A.11)
Because U
0 = 0 for all , the expression for ZP
v in
(A.3) reduces to
ZP
v= 0 for  ≤ ZP (A.12)
ZP
v= v
(
2− h
2
2
−
∫ 
ZP
x−h
x dx
)
for  ≥ ZP (A.13)
Simplifying (A.13) yields the expression in (2.13). 
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that 
= argmaxq U 
q=
. The conditions for a contract q
 
 to be both incen-
tive compatible and piracy indifferent are
= argmax
x
v
U
q
x − 
x (A.14)
vU
q
 − 
= sU

  for all  (A.15)
(A.14) ensures incentive compatibility, and (A.15) ensures
piracy indifference. First-order conditions for (A.14) for each
 yield
vUq
q
 q
= 
 for all  (A.16)
Now, differentiating (A.15) with respect to  and using the
fact that Uq

 = 0, one gets
vUq
(
q
 q
+ vU
q
 − 

= sU

  (A.17)
Substituting (A.16) into (A.17) yields
U
q
 =
sU

 
v
 (A.18)
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which on substitution of the functional form of U
q
yields
q
= s
v
 (A.19)
Substituting (A.19) into (A.15) and rearranging, one gets

= sv− s
2
2v
 (A.20)
Therefore, the simultaneous requirements of incentive com-
patibility and piracy indifference yield a unique contract.
Consequently, the unique piracy-indifferent contract is
qPI
v s= s
v
 (A.21)
PI
v s= sv− s
2
2v
 (A.22)

Proof of Theorem 1. The proof introduces some new
notation, which follows Jullien (2000) for the most part.
Define
hˆ
*= *− F 

f 

 (A.23)
Clearly, hˆ
1 = h
. Next, define
l
*= argmax
q
vU
q− hˆ
*U
q  (A.24)
First-order conditions for (A.24) yield
l
*= − hˆ
* (A.25)
Finally, define the set ,
,= ' l
1 ≤ qPI
v s≤ l
0 ( (A.26)
where qPI
v s is as defined in (3.7) of Lemma 2. It is
easily shown that l
0  > qPI
v s for all , and therefore
the latter inequality in (A.26) is redundant.
The following two intermediate results—Lemmas 3 and
4—are used in the proof of this theorem.
Lemma 3. If h
 is nonincreasing for all , then hˆ
*≤ 0
for all * such that hˆ
*≥ .
Proof. Assume the converse—that for some *, hˆ
* is
increasing in some interval 1 2. This implies that
*− F 
1
f 
1
<
*− F 
2
f 
2
 (A.27)
Because F 
1 < F 
2, this implies that f 
1 > f 
2, which
in turn implies that
1−*
f 
1
<
1−*
f 
2
 (A.28)
Adding (A.27) and (A.28) yields 1− F 
1/f 
1 <
1− F 
2/f 
2, which contradicts the fact that h
 is non-
increasing, and the result follows. 
Lemma 4. For all * such that hˆ
* ≥ , l
* >
qPI 
v s.
Proof. Differentiating (A.25) with respect to  yields
l
*= 1− hˆ
* (A.29)
which implies that l
* ≥ 1 because hˆ
* ≤ 0. Simi-
larly, differentiating (3.7) with respect to  yields
qPI 
v s=
s
v
< 1 (A.30)
and the result follows. 
Under Lemmas 3 and 4, all the conditions for Proposition
3 of Jullien (2000) to apply are met. Given that l
0  >
qPI
v s, the optimal contract is therefore specified by
q∗
v s= qPI
v s for  ∈, (A.31)
q∗
v s= l
1  for  ∈, (A.32)
From (A.25) and (3.7),
l
1 = −h
 (A.33)
qPI
v s= s
v
 (A.34)
Part (a): Under the conditions of Part (a) of the theorem,
h
≤ v− s/v. Because h
≤ 0, this implies that
h
≤ v− s
v
(A.35)
for all , which when combined with (A.33) and (A.34)
implies that
l
1  > qPI
v s (A.36)
and the set , is therefore empty. Comparing (A.33) and (2.9)
and using (A.32) yields
q∗
v s= qZP
v for all  (A.37)
The expression for ∗
v s follows from imposing profit
maximization, incentive compatibility, and the participation
constraint for = .
Part (b): Under the conditions of Part (b) of the theorem,
h
 > v− s/v. This implies that l
1 < qPI
v s.
Recall that the support of f 
 is the interval . Now,
because h
= 0, it is clear that l
1 > qPI
v s. Using
the fact that h
≤ 0, it is easily shown that , is an interval
 ˆ where
ˆ=  l
1 = qPI
v s (A.38)
Substituting the expressions for l
1  and qPI
v s into
(A.38) and rearranging yields
ˆ=  v− s= vh
 (A.39)
Consequently, from (A.31), (A.32), and (A.39), it follows that
q∗
v s= qPI
v s for  ≤ ˆ (A.40)
q∗
v s= qZP
v for  ≥ ˆ (A.41)
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where  is as defined in (A.39). The expressions for
∗
v s for  ≤ ˆ follow immediately from Lemma 2. For
 ≥ ˆ, the ∗
v s expressions follow from simultaneously
imposing profit maximization and incentive compatibility,
and account for the participation constraint of customer
type ˆ. 
The proof of Theorem 2 uses Lemma 5, which follows
directly from Theorem 1.
Lemma 5.
∫ 
ˆ
H
−H
ˆ− h
2/2f 
d > 0, where ˆ
is as defined in (3.5) of Theorem 1(b).
Proof. Assume the converse:∫ 
ˆ
[
H
−H
ˆ− h

2
2
]
f 
d ≤ 0 (A.42)
Now, for  ≥ ˆ, the optimal pricing schedule under Theorem
1(b) can be rearranged as
∗
= v− sˆ
2
2
+ v
[
H
−H
ˆ− h

2
2
]
 (A.43)
and the seller’s profits from the customer types in ˆ are
v− sˆ2
2
1− F 
ˆ
+ v
∫ 

[
H
−H
ˆ− h

2
2
]
f 
 (A.44)
(A.42) and (A.47) imply that the seller’s profits from ˆ
are lower than 12 v − sˆ21 − F 
ˆ. However, if the seller
were to offer customers in ˆ the fixed-fee contract
T = v− sˆ
2
2
 (A.45)
then all of these customer types would participate, yielding
profits of 12 v− sˆ21−F 
ˆ from the segment ˆ. More-
over, the fixed-fee contract would not affect incentive com-
patibility for  < ˆ. This means that the seller can (weakly)
improve the contract derived in Theorem 1(b), which con-
tradicts the fact that this is the unique optimal contract. The
result follows. 
Note that as ˆ tends to , Theorem 1(a) becomes applica-
ble, and in the limit the lemma also implies that∫ 

[
H
− h

2
2
]
f 
 > 0 (A.46)
(A.46) can also be derived using an argument similar to the
proof of this Lemma, but in the context of Theorem 1(a).
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall again that the support of
f 
 is the interval . First, consider the case when
h
≤ v
− s
/v
. From (4.7),
!
 = !L

=
∫ 

(
2v
− s

2
+ v

[
H
− h

2
2
])
f 
d
(A.47)
Differentiating (A.47) with respect to  yields
!L
 =
2v
− s

2
+ v

∫ 

[
H
− h

2
2
]
f 
d (A.48)
The optimal value of ∗ must satisfy the first-order condi-
tion !L

∗= 0. Rearranging (A.48),
v

∗− s
∗ =
−2v
∗
2
·
∫ 

[
H
− h

2
2
]
f 
d (A.49)
Using the fact that v
 < 0 for all , and Equation (A.46)
from Lemma 4, (A.49) implies that
v

∗− s
∗ > 0 (A.50)
Because v
 − s
 < 0, (A.50) implies that ∗ < e,
which completes the proof for lower levels of piracy.
Next, consider the case when h
≥ v
− s
/v
.
From (4.9),
!H
 =
(
s
v
−s

v

)∫ ˆ


2
2
f 
d
+v

∫ 
ˆ

(
H
− h

2
2
)
f 
d
+1−F 
ˆ

(
v
−s
ˆ
2
2
−v
H
ˆ

)

(A.51)
Differentiating both sides of (A.51) with respect to , can-
celling out common terms, and rearranging substantially
yields the following expression:
!H 
= f A
+ f B
+ f C
+ f D
+ f E
 (A.52)
where
f A
= s
v
−s

2
v
2
∫ ˆ


2
2
f 
d (A.53)
f B
= v
−s

·
[
1−F 
ˆ
 ˆ

2
2
+ s

2
v
2
∫ ˆ


2
2
f 
d
]

(A.54)
f C
=v

∫ 
ˆ

[
H
−H
ˆ− h

2
2
]
f 
d (A.55)
f D
= ˆ

[
1−F 
ˆ
][ˆ
v
−s

−v
h
ˆ
] (A.56)
f E
= ˆ
f 
ˆ

[
v
2h
ˆ
2−v
−s
2ˆ
2
2v

]

(A.57)
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From the definition of ˆ
, we know that
v
− s
ˆ
= v
h
ˆ
 (A.58)
Substituting (A.58) into (A.56) and (A.57) yields f D
 =
f E
 = 0 for all . Also, because s
 < 0, it follows that
f A
 < 0 for all . Moreover, Lemma 5 and the fact that
v
 < 0 imply that f C
 < 0 for all . Now, the optimal
value of ∗ must satisfy the first-order condition !H 

∗= 0.
Rearranging (A.52), this condition reduces to
f B
∗=−f A
∗+ f C
∗ (A.59)
Because we have established that f A
 < 0 f C
 < 0 for
all , (A.59) implies that f B
∗ > 0. For any ˆ
 < , the
term in square parentheses on the RHS of (A.54) is strictly
positive. In conjunction with (A.59), this in turn implies that
v

∗− s
∗ > 0 (A.60)
Because v
− s
 < 0, (A.60) implies that ∗ <e. 
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